Deeper Into "Free Will"

What are the stakes of Free Will? If Free Will exists, or doesn’t exist, who cares? What is even meant by Free Will? A few examples to warm our minds to the subject.

Ryan’s choice:

“Jack has a physiological condition that whenever a certain keyphrase is given, he is unable to disobey any order given after the statement of the keyphrase. Jack is unaware of the condition. Ryan knows about this, yet he refuses to use the keyword, instead believing that Jack’s Free Will is so important that it should not be tampered with. Not only this, Ryan refuses to tell Jack about his condition, even though his enemies actively use it.”

The problem I see with Ryan’s decision is that it presupposes that Jack has Free Will in some sort of objective sense. By the terms of this exercise, Jack cannot resist any order given to him using the keyphrase. Whether such a condition as the one described here could actually exist is a legitimate concern, but for right now arguing that Jack has Free Will is impossible. Jack does not have Free Will. He can do what he is ordered to do in any way that he might see fit, perhaps, but he cannot resist obeying the commands.

Ryan sacrifices his own agency for no reason. As a man, and as a leader, Ryan’s refusal to at least inform Jack of his condition compromises his own life. Encouraging individuals to have their own agency is a legitimate argument and moral standpoint, but with it comes the responsibility to defend one’s own agency, and own life.

Plato:

Plato has made an extensive list of arguments in terms of will and justice and whatnot, and instead of attempting to gloss all of them here instead I will present an argument that is not Plato’s but instead is my own argument with some, but not all, of Plato’s arguments in mind.

A Platonic-ish argument: “We are incapable of doing what we believe is wrong.”

I distance Plato so much from this argument because I want to explain my problems with it in its own terms, instead of treading through all of what Plato has said. First, it is important to point out that this argument is poorly designed, poorly defined, and poorly conceived. It is, in essence, an argument that is either true or false depending on your fancy. If it is true, it relies on a self-correcting system.

How could it be true? I actually have argued a very similar claim, however in such a way that includes my penchant for nuance. I phrase it as such:

“All individuals act in regard to their own perceived best interest.”

This is a self-correcting system, and I believe that because of this it can be regarded as a true but nearly useless statement. I only use it as a reaction against other claims that I think are even worse.

Why is this a self-correcting system? Because it can emphasize different parts of the clauses at different times. What if someone does something that they believe will hurt themselves? Well, if they have decided to hurt themselves, then they believe that that is the best course of action. What if someone tries to help someone but hurts them instead? Well, they acted in what they perceived to be the best course of action—but they were wrong.

The problem with this sentiment, and this statement, is that if you understand the way in which it’s true, if it is true it can’t be shown to be wrong. If it can’t be wrong, that technically makes it a belief—and that is due largely to its phrasing, and simply being too general. (Perhaps you could try to argue against it on empirical grounds—suppose you include reflexes in your definition of human behavior. If you do, then you can hardly say when someone’s leg kicks after you hit the knee with a rubber mallet is a result of their “perceived best interest.” Suppose you hit someone’s knee and they precede to kick a child in the face. That would not exactly support Plato’s claim either.) In any case, you cannot gloss human nature so quickly and do justice to the complexity of human relationships and human choices.

Now, does this argument support or deny Free Will? As always, that largely depends on how you define Free Will. My version might at first seem to support Free Will, whereas Plato’s might seem to go against it—even though both essentially argue the same thing.

Desmond’s choice:

Desmond’s friend Al has a magical rock that will make anyone obey his will. Desmond believes that Al using the rock to control others is a morally wrong choice, because it interferes with their Free Will. Yet, Al argues that his choice is incredibly just, since he seeks to end all war.

The problem with this example, borderlining on some problems with “Ryan’s Choice” is that it oversimplifies human action. The “magical rock” in this example is very poorly conceived. I would say that if Al really was a “good” person and only used to the rock to end certain forms of conflict, then how “wrong” really would that be? Desmond’s choice here comes very close to Regina’s choice that I will discuss later on, both positions of which I disagree with for the same reason that I disagree with Ryan’s choice. Free Will may very well be the case, but if it is, then you too have it—and you too should express it. And if you believe that certain forms of violence are wrong (the third Crusade, for instance) then to NOT use the tools available to you to end that conflict, then you sacrifice your own free will for absolutely nothing.

Going back to the “magic” of Al’s “magical rock”—does the rock tell people when their hearts beat? When to breathe? At least the command word in Ryan’s choice was contingent on a command word, and even then we have to presume there was a fair amount of interpretation. Here, the magic of Al’s rock presume absolute control of the human mind and human body. Quite frankly, too much occurs in the human body to presume that absolute control can be expressed verbally. How many muscles must move, how much blood must move, how many times must the heart beat to simply open and close a hand? And if not all of those processes are taken over by the magical rock, if there is room left for interpretation, then how absolute is this supposed control? Is there not still the very “will” that was supposed to be taken? And is there not even, then, still the propensity and capacity for violence?

Now, let’s consider Regina’s choice, as she recounts:

“The Holy Spirit took me into an experience, which I call a "gratitude experience." In this experience, Holy Spirit took me to see war. As I looked on the war with the Holy Spirit, I saw all of the horrors of modern war. There were horrible injuries, death, loneliness, fear, suffering, destruction, lack of life sustaining necessities like food, water, electricity... I heard wailing, and I smelled fear.

But then, Holy Spirit seemed to take me beyond the war to a place or dimension that was behind it. This place was formless, so there was nothing to see with eyes, but yet it could be seen (or known) with the mind. And what I saw there is what I call Us. It was one thing...one formless thing of movement...and it was Us as one.

I remember what I felt when I saw this formless movement. It was a feeling that defies description, because it was gratitude beyond any gratitude I have ever felt in the world. I feel certain it was Holy Spirit's gratitude that I felt. And Holy Spirit was grateful for the perfect freedom that this thing was. To Holy Spirit, war was not the suffering I seemed to see before we passed through the veil. War was a symbol of Our perfect and unlimited freedom. Holy Spirit was grateful...joyously and celebratingly grateful...that We are perfectly unlimited in Our freedom. And war was a perfect symbol of that unlimitedness.

I'll never forget this experience, because the war at this point became meaningless. All I cared about was that freedom. Freedom without limits was the most magnificent gift imaginable, and to witness it with such love was incredible. I wouldn't have changed a single thing about the war that I had seen, because I would never have wanted to interfere with the gift of perfect unlimited freedom.”


Before I respond or comment to Regina’s choice here, the argument that she “wouldn't have changed a single thing about the war that I had seen, because [she] would never have wanted to interfere with the gift of perfect unlimited freedom” which is the major claim I question, I will further contextualize Regina’s choice by positing further arguments by her:

Regina argues:


““We have free will and our actions in every moment are pre-determined.” "Determinism," or pre-destiny, comes from our absolute and perfectly unlimited free will.

We are not separate beings, but one creative mind experiencing itself as separate beings. Free will is not expressed at the level of experience (separation), but at the level of creation (oneness).

Our oneness is like a child playing with several dolls. The child makes all of the decisions. If the child decides to play war, the dolls have no choice about being played with in that way. If the child decides to act out a romance, the dolls are played with in that way. If a car accident and heroic doctor are imagined, that is the game that is played. If the doll had awareness, the doll would experience determinism or destiny. Yet the doll's experience is not separate from the child's Imagination or decisions.

At the level of child (or oneness), there is complete free will. At the level of doll (conscious awareness or point of experience), there is only experiencing what has been determined. But since we are really the child, it IS free will. Determinism is only the experience.”


The “dolls and children” argument is an interesting one, yet it relies on an appeal to some sort of collective consciousness that I have difficulty accepting, especially when it results in the sentiments expressed that “I wouldn’t change that war” in the gratitude experience. That aside, I can see how Regina’s arguments could work, if you take it from a vaguely solipsist point of view.

It is true that our minds mediate our experience, that what we perceive as “reality” is in fact our mind recreating our events and creating the façade of narrative based on available stimulus. From this, one might make the argument that what we experience is a mixture of determinism and free will. Our brain, if it is true that it shapes how we perceive the world, would indeed dictate through its free will a world that we would perceive as determinism.

Yet, I dislike the sense of agency withdrawal that Regina seems to accept as an entailment of this conceptualization. Because our minds shape our experience, or any other form of oneness, does not imply to me that we should “not interfere” with the “unlimited free will” of our minds. Even if this scenario is true, there is no reason not to express our desires and actions as based on the conscious part of our mind and brains.

To accept that there may very well be a relationship between what we perceive and our sense of “free will” and “determinism” is not to leave us feeling as though someone has just uttered the secret keyphrase, that we are now helpless and without agency. In truth, the arguments only really become relevant when pitted with agency, and our capacity to interact with the world.

I am more compelled to agree with the sentiment of a different conception of Free Will: one that advocates agency instead of an “objectivity” unmediated by criticism of the mind.

As Andy argues:


“For instance, some say you can't fly by flapping your wings, so they don't have their version of "Free Will". My idea is that, although of course we have a course we follow which is more or less set by our chain of life choices made previously...we can, if we desire to strongly enough, change that course...WITHIN the LIMITS of ENVIRONMENT, HISTORY, ABILITY, and PHYSICS. Most of us have shaped our course into a comfortable cruise lane, and see no need to make drastic changes...but that does not preclude our doing so.

In my case, for instance, I had a very accomplished and successful and enjoyable career in Aircraft Electronics for 26 years...then in '96 I became disenchanted with the Ethical environs of the Industry...and stopped working in it. It was a huge life-altering decision, and not demanded or determined by anything in my previous history, other than my Ethical decision to do it. It was, in fact, economically and realistically VERY difficult to make –and carry out- that decision.

I call that "Free Will".”