On Free Will

On Free Will

The thought that man might not have free will can at first be terrifying. It makes it seem as though they are strapped to a table, unable to move, to speak, to do anything.

Yet, this is not what people always mean when they say man does not have free will. Instead, they might take issue with the idea of what could be regarded as “determinism.” Under a deterministic model, you can do or say anything you would otherwise do. In this sense, the world operating under a deterministic model and the world operating with “Free Will” are synonymous, and the distinction between them is meaningless. Neither can be defended or supported without relying on some sort of post-hoc or ad-hoc change, in a way similar to the “No True Scotsman” fallacy. “I chose to do that” or “You were going to do that anyway.” How much of a difference does it really make if either is true?

Some who fear a deterministic model of the universe characterize their worries in terms of a lack of what I will call “specialness” in human action. An argument might go like this):

“There are no brilliant thoughts or ideas; all thoughts and ideas are determined. Without independence, all you are left with the necessary effects of antecedent causes… In fact a thought and a non-thought are exactly the same thing: the necessary effects of antecedent causes.”

Does a deterministic model mean that there are "no brilliant thoughts or ideas"? No. After all, not every creature on the earth can think the same thoughts. That the capacity think is determined by antecedent causes does not mean that all thoughts are the same. Quite the contrary, thoughts are just that: thoughts. That is not a “good” or a “bad” thing, it is merely a state of affairs. It is only a problem if you need to have your existance, or your thoughts, or your actions, "validated" or “made special” by some hypothetical otherworldly or supernatural being, something outside the control of human agency.

What an opponent of determinism doesn't want to believe is that *they* are the result of antecedent causes. Their concerns of “Man” having or having not a “determined” life is peripheral. They assert “independence” and their unique “specialness”. The specialness, that, it seems, is only possible when it is given by something outside their direct control. Other kinds of specialness, the love of friends or family or pets, a sense of purpose in their real lives, or other forms of value are irrelevent, somehow outside the imaginative prospects of someone if they don’t have “free will.”

Certainly a sense of worry might arise that “love” for instance is anything other than transcendant, or near-supernatural. To assert that love is anything other than the result of some transcendant “choice” appears to be blasphemy. “No matter what, X will love you.”

However, how important really is that sense of love? “I love you. God has told me that I have to hide you, starve you, and eventually kill you. So that is what I will do. No matter what, I’m sure you’ll love me, and I’ll love you, though.” What is more important to you—the fact that this person loves you, or the fact that they’re going to starve you to death for no reason other than because “God told me to.” If they really loved you, they might let you exercise some of that “free will” so often argued about and get the hell out of there.

What are the limits of “Free Will”? If you were shot right now, could a moment later could you "choose" to have not been shot? No. If you were in a car crash, could you "will" your car back into rightful being? No. If you can't do those things, what really does "free will" mean? After all, doesn't "free" mean "without restrictions?" And if I have no restrictions, shouldn't I be able to do *anything I want?*

People don't have absolute free will. There are antecedent factors in all “choices” and antecedent causes to all events on the level of daily events (that is, ignoring for now certain questions of cause in theoretical physics).

My capacities for language are governed by the gramatical patterns established in my brain, and my knowledge of what qualifies as a meaningful sentence and meaningful words. As such, language has “antecedent causes.” If my brain was damaged, I would lack the gramattical capacities to write meaningful sentence. I would not be able to choose to write a meaningful sentence. If I am unable to have absolute control over how I express my thoughts, how relevant is the question of whether I even have free thoughts or free will at all?

Does this mean I don't have free will? Well, there is such an immensity of stimuli, and so many factors that go into any given decision I make, that due to the incapacity of my own or anyone's mind to understand the complexity of my decisions, you may as well call that free will. Free will need not be absolute or transcendent to still be meaningful. Calling what I choose to do “my choice” is still more efficacious than always going into the milieu of antecedent causes. Although this may be misleading, my choice to regard writing this sentence, for instance, as an example of choice does not therefore imply a belief in transcendant, or rather, supernatural choice as the result of “Free Will.”